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There have long been demands for more coherence in EU external action. The Lisbon 
Treaty has introduced important institutional changes in this respect. However, 
coherence – in the broad sense of a positive process that is focused on establishing 
synergies between various policy fields and actors – is still largely lacking for an EU 
foreign investment policy. An institutional bifurcation of different Directorates-
General puts fuel to the fire of a conceptual confusion of intra-EU and extra-EU 
investment agreements. As a consequence, overarching concerns such as compatibility 
with the principle of autonomy or effects of investor-state arbitration on the internal 
market are missing a coherent approach.  
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I. INTRODUCTION   
 
'Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?' Although Henry Kissinger 
probably never actually made this remark,1 it may by now be one of the 
most often quoted sentence in textbooks on EU law. It does indeed 
convey a discomforting sense of reality. EU external relations law is a 
                                                
* PhD Candidate in International Law at the University of Gothenburg 
(hannes.lenk@law.gu.se). The author is grateful for the valuable input and comments 
from Joel Dahlquist.  
1Gideon Rachman, 'Kissinger never wanted to dial Europe', FT Blogs: The World 
http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2009/07/kissinger-never-wanted-to-dial-europe/, 
accessed on 18 December 2015. 
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confusing and complex, almost impenetrable aspect of EU law. This is 
partly due to technical legal dimension such as the delimitation of 
competences. More importantly, though, the EU lacks a sense of 
persistence and reliability when acting internationally. There is in fact a 
requirement of coherence underlying EU external action. Falling short of a 
legal principle, however, it is more of an idea; a notion of unity in EU 
internal and external policy. The Lisbon Treaty meant to make the 
requirement of coherence more tangible. Using the example of investor-
state arbitration (ISDS), the present essay, however, challenges the idea of 
coherence as an underlying principle of EU foreign investment policy. 
Whereas the Commission strongly opposes ISDS in intra-EU bilateral 
investment agreements (BITs), i.e. BITs concluded between two Member 
States, it vigorously supports the inclusion of ISDS in EU investment 
agreements. Additionally, the position of Member States diverges 
significantly on the question of validity of ISDS provisions in intra-EU 
BITs. This essay claims that the resulting incoherence is rooted in the 
misconceived application of 'intra-EU' and 'extra-EU' as more than 
descriptive concepts and the lack of political willingness of Member States.  
 
This first part introduces the requirement for coherence and briefly 
discusses how it relates to the field of EU foreign investment policy. The 
second part discusses the Commission's and the Member States' position 
vis-à-vis ISDS in intra-EU and extra-EU BITs. The last part demonstrates 
that a misconception of 'intra-EU' and 'extra-EU' as distinct concepts or 
categories of international agreements is causing contradictory positions 
within the Commission, and prevents the formation of a coherent EU 
foreign investment policy. 
 
II. COHERENCE IN EU EXTERNAL ACTION: THE LEGACY OF 
LISBON 
 
The requirement of coherence must principally be understood in the 
context of the Treaty of Maastricht, which left the EU divided along three 
distinct and separate pillars. While the Community was supranational in 
character, the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters remained intergovernmental.2 The 
pillars made it virtually impossible for the EU to engage as a unified entity 
in foreign policy, hence the desire for a single contact point for third 
countries. The 2007 Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) was thus 
explicitly endowed with '… enhancing the efficiency and democratic 
legitimacy of the enlarged Union, as well as the coherence of its external 
action.'3 The Commission emphasizes in similar terms the importance of '… 
                                                
2 Ramses A Wessel, 'The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation in EU 
External Relations' (2000) 37(5) Common Market Law Review 1135.  
3 IGC 2007 mandate, para 1, emphasis added; the mandate was concluded by the 
European Council of 21-22 June 2007 and a draft mandate was attached to the 
Presidency Conclusions of 20 July 2007 (Doc ST 11177/1/07 REV 1). 
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articulating coherent and effective external policies…'.4The Lisbon Treaty 
subsequently delivered a wide-ranging reform.5 It abolished the pillars and 
further integrated CFSP into the unified institutional framework. It 
shifted responsibility for external representation on issues concerning 
CFSP from the rotating presidency of the Council to the president-elect of 
the European Council.6 It strengthened the role of the High 
Representative, who presides over the Foreign Affairs Council, is vice-
president of the Commission, and also takes part in the work of the 
European Council.7 And most importantly, it consolidated a substantive 
requirement of coherence in Article 13(1) of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), which now reads: 'The Union shall have an institutional framework 
which shall […] ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its 
policies and actions.' Additionally, Article 21(3) TEU requires explicitly 
that, '[t]he Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of 
its external action and between these and its other policies.' 
 
In order to understand the content of this requirement, it is paramount to 
first address a linguistic discrepancy of the different language versions of 
the TEU. Where the English language version refers to 'consistency' the 
French and German language versions, for instance, refer to 'cohérence' and 
'Kohärenz', respectively. This could be dismissed as mere linguistic 
variance, which defied the constitutional reform. Nonetheless, as a lawyer 
one cannot ignore that coherence and consistency transcend language and 
manifest themselves in two substantively distinct concepts. While 
consistency is limited to the absence of substantive incompatibility, 
coherence refers to a positive and dynamic process focused on creating 
synergies between various policies and actors.8 'Hence, coherence in law 
would be a matter of degree, whereas consistency would be a static notion 
in the sense that concepts of law can be more or less coherent but cannot 
be more or less consistent. They are either consistent or not.'9  
 
Thus, the Treaty requires a dynamic process that establishes synergies, 
rather than laying out the static objective of achieving overall 
compatibility.10 In this respect, however, the Lisbon Treaty merely puts 
lipstick on a pig, a futile attempt to conceal real impediments for policy 
                                                
4 Commission Communication, 'Europe in the World – Some Practical Proposals for 
Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility', (COM(2006) 278 final), 5.  
5 On the structural and institutional changes see Jan Gaspers, 'The quest for 
European foreign policy consistency and the Treaty of Lisbon' (2008) Humanitas 
Journal of European Studies, accessible at 
http://www.sbc.org.pl/dlibra/publication?id=13362&tab=3. 
6 Art 15(6) TEU.  
7 Arts 18(4) and 15(2) TEU, respectively. 
8 Christophe Hillion, 'Tous pour un, un pour tous! Coherence in the External 
Relations of the European Union' in Marise Cremona (ed), Developments in EU 
External Relations Law (OUP 2008), 13-14; Wessel (n 2), 1150. 
9 Hillion (n 8), 14; Wessel (n 2), 1150. 
10 Pascal Gauttier, 'Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences of the 
European Union' (2004) 10(1) European Law Journal 23, 26; Hillion (n 8), 15. 
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coherence with institutional appearances. If anything, Lisbon enhanced 
horizontal cross-pillar coherence, albeit that CFSP still remains the odd-
one-out amongst the EU's external policies.11 But the need for coherence 
goes beyond managing the intergovernmental and supranational structures 
of the post-Maastricht pillar architecture.12 Article 13 TEU indicates that 
coherence stretches across all policy fields, external as well as internal. 
More importantly, though, it is a multi-dimensional concept. In addition 
to its horizontal cross-pillar dimension, coherence must also be pursued 
horizontally within a policy field. It, furthermore, extends vertically, i.e. in 
an EU-Member State relationship, and institutionally, i.e. between policies 
of different EU institutions as well as policies formulated in different 
departments of the same EU institution.13 
 
This is of particular importance for EU foreign investment policy. 
Internally, investment is largely regulated through the internal market 
provisions in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), and in particular the free movement of capital and the right of 
establishment. However, there still is a tight network of intra-EU BITs in 
force. Externally, on the other hand, the EU was endowed with external 
competence in the regulation of foreign direct investment (FDI) only with 
the Lisbon Treaty. Nonetheless, there are already a number of EU 
investment agreements14 under negotiation, i.e. EU-Singapore free trade 
agreement (FTA)15 and the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA),16. Moreover, the EU approach to drafting ISDS 
provisions currently transitions towards a permanent investment court in 
the EU-Vietnam FTA17 and the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership18 (TTIP) agreement.19 One might, therefore, 
                                                
11 Piet Eeckhout, 'The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy after Lisbon: From 
Pillar Talk to Constitutionalism' in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie 
Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon (OUP 2012), 269. 
12 Gauttier (n 10), 27; Hillion (n 8); Wessel (n 2). 
13 Carmen Gebhard, 'Coherence' in Christopher J Hill and Michael Smith (eds), 
International relations and the European Union, 2nd vol  (OUP 2011), 107-109. 
14 For the purpose of this paper the term 'EU investment agreement' includes EU 
trade agreements with comprehensive chapters on investment, and which provide for 
investor-state dispute resolution. 
15 Commission Press Release, 'Singapore: The Commission to request a Court of 
Justice Opinion on the trade deal', Brussels, 30 October 2014, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1235_en.htm, accessed on 19 Dec 2015. 
16 Commission Press Release, 'Canada–EU Summit – A new era in Canada–EU 
relations: Declaration by the Prime Minister of Canada and the Presidents of the 
European Council and the European Commission', Ottawa, 29 September 2014 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-288_en.htm accessed on 19 
December 2015. 
17 Press Statement by the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude 
Juncker, the President of the European Council Donald Tusk and the Prime 
Minister of Viet Nam Nguyen Tan Dung, Brussels, 2 December 2015 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5467_en.htm accessed on 19 Dec 2015. 
18 Council of the European Union, 'Directives for the negotiation on the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and 
the United States of America' (Doc ST 11103/13). 
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expect the Commission and the Member States to work together towards 
a coherent approach on ISDS provisions in investment agreements. On the 
contrary, however, as we will see the schizophrenic position of the 
Commission on ISDS in intra-EU BITs and EU investment agreements is 
only exacerbated by the Member States' pursuit of diverging national 
interests in intra-EU investment disputes.  
 
III. THE COMMISSION'S POSITION ON INVESTOR-STATE 
ARBITRATION 
 
1. The Case of intra-EU BITs 
Intra-EU BITs are in fact a peculiar phenomenon of EU enlargement. 
Most of the Eastern European and Mediterranean countries that acceded 
to the EU in 2004 and 2007 transitioned from heavily state-controlled to 
free-market economies only since the early 1990s. In the eyes of the EU, 
these economies had to become more stable, more investor friendly and 
more integrated into the EU market. Unsurprisingly, these states moved 
on to conclude numerous BITs with 'old' Member States. It is ironic, 
though, that the conclusion of these BITs was explicitly encouraged by the 
EU,20 seemingly unaware that they would turn into BITs between Member 
States upon accession. Having turned into a threat for the integrity of the 
internal market, the Commission is now fighting intra-EU BITs as a beast 
of its own creation.   
 
Even less comprehensible is the fact that the EU was distinctly aware of 
the problem, but refused to address it. Reports of the Economic and 
Financial Committee have raised the issue as early as 2006, but neither the 
Member States nor the EU have demonstrated much interest in resolving 
it. The EU sat on a ticking bomb and decided to simply wait and see 
whether, and to what extent, an explosion would materialize on the 
internal market. In the meantime, the Commission focused its action on 
interventions as amicus curiae, in a number of intra-EU investment disputes. 
In US Steel v. Slovakia21 and EURAM v. Slovakia,22 for instance, the 
Commission submitted briefs emphasizing above all that ISDS in intra-EU 
BITs constitutes a violation of the EU principle of non-discrimination. In 
                                                
 
19 The Commission presented a revised textual proposal for a permanent investment 
court in TTIP on 12 November 2015 
 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1396&title=EU-finalises-
proposal-for-investment-protection-and-Court-System-for-TTIP accessed on 19 
December 2015. 
20 See, for instance, OJ L 357/2, 31.12.1994, Europe Agreement Establishing an 
Association Between the European Economic Communities and their Member 
States, of the One Part, and Romania, of the Other Part signed on 21.12.1993, art 
74(2). 
21 U.S. Steel Global Holdings I B.V. v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, (PCA Case No. 
2013-16).  
22 European American Investment Bank AG (EURAM) v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, 
(PCA Case No. 2010-17). 
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Micula v. Romania23 the Commission focused on the supremacy of EU law 
over the intra-EU BIT. Investment tribunals have, however, largely 
ignored interventions of the Commission on these points. Other 
arguments of the Commission are based on international law, and in 
particular Articles 30(3) and 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 1969. Accordingly, in three disputes against Slovakia the 
Commission reasoned that EU Treaties supersede or alternatively 
impliedly terminate pre-accession intra-EU BIT.24 
 
However, the number of investment disputes initiated under intra-EU 
BITs has significantly increased during the last decade. And not least since 
the Micula award, which effectively reinstated illegal state aid, the issue 
now puts increasingly more pressure on the EU. On June 18, 2015 the 
Commission finally took a proactive approach by formally notifying five 
Member States of the initiation of infringement proceedings over the 
termination of intra-EU BITs.25 The formal letter of notification sent to 
the Swedish government26 is for present purposes considered to illustrate 
the Commission's general position vis-à-vis intra-EU BITs. In this letter, 
the Commission pursues a number of arguments. Most relevant, and by all 
means most convincing is the reasoning that the substantive as well as 
procedural protection provided under intra-EU BITs violates the principle 
of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality, a cornerstone of the 
EU's internal market. In as far as BITs simply provide more favorable 
rights to investors than those available under the Treaty, these agreements 
do not present a prima facie violation of EU law.27 However, investors of a 
nationality other than that of either State Party to an intra-EU BIT will 
neither benefit from the substantive rights nor have access to procedural 
dispute resolution mechanisms, such as investor-state arbitration. In other 
words, these investors are effectively discriminated against on the ground 
of their (corporate) nationality. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the 
general principle of non-discrimination, now enshrined in Article 18 
                                                
23 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. 
Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania, ICSID (Case No. ARB/05/20). 
24 U.S. Steel (n 21); EURAM (n 22); and Achmea B.V. (formerly Eureko) v. The Slovak 
Republic, UNCITRAL, (PCA Case No. 2008-13). 
25 Commission Press Release, 'Commission asks Member States to terminate their 
intra-EU bilateral investment treaties', Brussels, 18 June 2015,  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5198_en.htm, accessed on 19 December 
2015; for a comprehensive analysis of the Commission's reasoning see Joel Dahlquist, 
Hannes Lenk, Love Rönnelid, 'The infringement proceedings over intra-EU 
investment treaties – an analysis of the case against Sweden' (2016) SIEPS European 
Policy Analysis, forthcoming.  
26 Formell underrättelse – överträdelse nummer 2013/2207, skrivelse från Europeiska 
kommissionen, Generalsekretariatet till Sveriges ständiga representation vid 
Europeiska unionen, June 18 2015 (only available in Swedish). 
27 Angelos Dimopoulos, 'The Validity and Applicatbility of International Investment 
Agreements Between EU Member States under EU and International Law' (2011) 48 
Common Market Law Review 63, 78; Hanno Wehland, 'Intra-EU Investment 
Agreements and Arbitration: Is European Community Law an Obstacle?' (2009) 58(2) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 297, 310. 
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TFEU, not only applies to natural persons but also extends to legal entities 
on the internal market.28  
 
All in all, the focus of the Commission in respect of ISDS in intra-EU 
BITs is clear: presenting a Treaty violation they need to go! This position 
is equally reflected in the Commission's amicus briefs, which broadly attack 
the jurisdiction of tribunals and claim the inapplicability of intra-EU BITs. 
One might expect similar concerns to arise in the context of EU 
investment agreements. Paradoxically, though, the compatibility of ISDS 
in these agreements with EU law plays no significant role in EU foreign 
investment policy. 
 
2. The Case of EU Investment Agreements 
With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty Article 207 TFEU 
endowed the EU with exclusive competence in FDI as part of its common 
commercial policy. BITs traditionally cover FDI as well as portfolio 
investments and it remains unclear in this respect if the conclusion of 
traditional investment agreements falls entirely within EU competence.29 
The issue has recently been brought before the CJEU in a request for an 
opinion under Article 218(11) TFEU on the EU-Singapore FTA.30 
Regardless of the outcome of the CJEU's opinion, as long as the subject 
matter of EU investment agreements falls broadly within the scope of the 
post-Lisbon common commercial policy the EU is in principle also 
competent to negotiate ISDS provisions.  
 
In July 2010 the Commission issued a communication clarifying how it 
plans on using its new competence. The communication emphasizes the 
link between FDI and economic growth and welfare, and underlines the 
importance of investment agreements as an instrument to harness these 
benefits. On investor-state arbitration, the communication reads:  
 
Investor-state [arbitration] is such an established feature of 
investment agreements that its absence would in fact discourage 
                                                
28 Case C-221/89 The Queen/Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame 
EU:C:1991:320. 
29 The Commission rather strongly argues in favor of a comprehensive investment 
competences, see Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility linked to 
investor-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international agreements to 
which the European Union is party (COM (2012) 335 final), pt 1.2. 
30 OJ C 363/18, 3.11.2015, Request for an opinion submitted by the European 
Commission pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, (2015/C 363/22).  The request reads: 
'Does the Union have the requisite competence to sign and conclude alone the Free 
Trade Agreement with Singapore? More specifically: 
- Which provisions of the agreement fall within the Union's exclusive 
competence? 
- Which provisions of the agreement fall within the Union's shared 
competence? and 
Is there any provision of the agreement that falls within the exclusive competence of 
the Member States?' 
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investors and make a host economy less attractive than others. For 
these reasons, future EU agreements including investment 
protection should include investor-state dispute settlement.31  
 
The communication also acknowledges that the inclusion of ISDS 
provisions in EU agreements presents challenges in broadly two respects. 
First, the respective responsibility of the EU and its Member States for 
measures challenged in investment arbitration needs to be clarified. 
Second EU investment agreements should endeavor to reform ISDS by 
increasing transparency, foreseeability and independence of arbitrators.  
 
The Commission addressed the first challenge in its proposal for a 
regulation, which was adopted in July 2014.32 Regulation 912/2014 lays out 
the internal framework for the attribution of financial responsibility 
between the EU and the Member States and governs the question on who 
is best placed to act as respondent before an investment tribunal. It is, 
thus, based on the assumption that future EU investment agreements 
provide for ISDS provisions and the Commission's proposal, referring to 
the Commission's earlier communication, was explicit in this respect.33 
The second challenge found strong reinforcement in public protest 
surrounding the TTIP negotiations. The vociferous criticism of ISDS in 
TTIP focuses on the disruptive effect of allegedly pro-investor tribunals on 
domestic regulation. The Commission swiftly responded with a far-
reaching transparency campaign and provided open access to a number of 
key policy and negotiating documents.34 The categorical rejection of ISDS 
in TTIP was even more clearly reflected in the nearly 150,000 replies to 
the public consultation that was launched in March 2014.35 However, 
rather than outright excluding ISDS from the TTIP negotiations, which 
would have appeared to be the obvious consequence of the public 
consultation, the Commission wrapped investor-state dispute resolution 
into a mantle of democratic reform. A 'new system […] which is subject to 
democratic principles and scrutiny' was also the explicit conditio sine qua non 
                                                
31 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
'Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy' 
(COM(2010)343 final, 2010), 10. 
32 OJ L 257/121, 28.8.2014, Regulation 912/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 July 2014 establishing a framework for managing financial responsibility 
linked to investor-to-state dispute settlement tribunals established by international 
agreements to which the European Union is party. 
33 Proposal for a Regulation financial responsibility (n 29) , pt. 1.1. 
34 Commission Press Release, 'European Commission publishes TTIP legal texts as 
part of transparency initiative', Brussels, 7 January 2015 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-2980_en.htm accessed on 19 Dec 2015. 
35 Commission Staff Working Document, 'Report on Online public consultation on 
investment protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement' (SWD(2015) 3 final), in 
particular see pt. 3.1. 
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for the European Parliament's consent to TTIP.36 It is on this backdrop 
that one has to read the Commission proposal for a permanent investment 
court in TTIP, and broader ambition for multilateral efforts in this 
respect.37 Bottom line: investor-state dispute resolution is inseparable from 
EU trade and investment agreements, although perhaps in different form 
and shape. 
 
In her concept paper of May 2015,38 Trade Commissioner Cecilia 
Malmström discusses the opportunity for the EU to reform the traditional 
ISDS system in order to fully ensure the right to regulate for the EU and 
its Member States. The concept paper highlights the progress that has 
already been made in the EU-Singapore FTA and CETA, which, absurdly 
enough, feature traditional ISDS provisions. It also underlines the 
aspirations to develop a permanent investment court with an appeal 
mechanism. Whereas the prospects for such a mechanism are unclear in 
the context of TTIP, it appears to be already part of the EU-Vietnam 
FTA.39 Then, in October 2015, the Commission released its new trade 
strategy that once again lays focus on the EU as a reform actor in the field 
of investment protection by reinforcing the right to regulate and 
transparency, particularly with regard to enhancing legitimacy of investor-
state dispute resolution.40  
 
The transition towards a more institutionalized and more court-like ISDS 
mechanism in future EU trade and investment agreements responds to the 
concerns voiced by public society and demands from the European 
Parliament. Nevertheless, none of these aspects addresses the 
compatibility of ISDS provisions with EU law. Considering the 
Commission's forceful attempts to wipe out intra-EU BITs specifically 
because of the effect that ISDS has on the internal market, it is startling 
that none of the above documents addresses the effect of ISDS in EU 
investment agreements. On the contrary, the positive effects of ISDS on 
the level of investment protection in these agreements have clearly been 
endorsed. And on the wider issue of compatibility, only the concept paper 
                                                
36 European Parliament resolution of 8 July 2015 containing the European 
Parliament's recommendations to the European Commission on the negotiations for 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (2014/2228(INI), pt. 2.xv. 
37 Commission Press Release, 'EU finalises proposal for investment protection and 
Court System for TTIP', Brussels, 12 November 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6059_en.htm, accessed on 19 Dec 2015; for the revised negotiating text 
see n 19. 
38 Cecilia Malmström, 'Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform: 
Enhancing the right to regulate and moving from current ad hoc arbitration towards 
an Investment Court', Concept Paper, 5 May 2015 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF accessed on 20 
December 2015. 
39Cecilia Malmström, 'Done deal with Vietnam', Blog, 2 Dec 2015 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/done-deal-
vietnam_enaccessed on 20 December 2015. 
40 European Commission, 'Trade for all - Towards a more responsible trade and 
investment policy', 14 October  2015, pt. 4.1.2. 
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briefly acknowledges the relevance of the principle of autonomy, before 
quickly dismissing any risk of incompatibility on that basis. In the light of 
Opinion 2/13,41 however, there remain legitimate concerns that ISDS 
provisions clash with the principle of autonomy.42 And even though these 
concerns can be addressed through drafting,43 a shift from traditional ISDS 
to a permanent investment court are not going to do the trick. 
 
3. The Position of the Member States 
Now turning to the position of the Member States, it is noteworthy that, 
the unaligned EU approach towards ISDS is not only reflected 
institutionally within the Commission, but also perpetuated vertically in 
the EU-Member State relationship. Despite the commonly acknowledged 
inconsistencies of intra-EU BITs with the internal market, Member States 
have thus far lacked a common approach on the validity of ISDS 
provisions in intra-EU BITs. This gap is particularly obvious when 
comparing the submissions of respondent states with those of the 
investor's home country, i.e. the Member State of which the investor is a 
national. Moreover, Member State submissions are often not in line with 
observations advanced by the Commission. In Achmea, for instance, the 
Commission intervened as amicus curiae challenging the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal.44 In its observations the Commission takes the position that, 
although the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT was not impliedly terminated 
(Article 59 VCLT), in accordance with Article 30(3) VCLT the provisions 
on dispute resolution are no longer applicable.45 Although Slovakia 
generally supports the Commission's line of reasoning, it does not, unlike 
the Commission, pursue arguments purely based on EU law such as a 
violation of the EU principle of non-discrimination. The Netherlands also 
intervened as amicus curiae before the tribunal, forcefully arguing in favour 
of the continuous application of the BIT.46 The tribunal in Achmea largely 
ignored the arguments made by the Commission on the basis of EU law, 
and disagreed with Slovakia on its interpretation of Articles 59 and 30(3) 
VCLT. 
 
Subsequently in EURAM the Commission also submitted written 
observations, challenging the jurisdiction of the tribunal on similar 
grounds. This time, however, the Commission '… confines its arguments to EU 
law'.47 The Commission maintains that the subject matter of the BIT falls 
squarely within the scope of the TFEU and presents a violation of the non-
                                                
41 Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, EU:C:2014:2454. 
42 Hannes Lenk, 'Investor-state arbitration under TTIP: Resolving investment 
disputes in an (autonomous) EU legal order' (SIEPS Report (2015:3), 2015). 
43 Stephan W Schill, 'Editorial: Opinion 2/13 – The End for Dispute Settlement in EU 
Trade and Investment Agreements?' (2015) 16(3) The Journal of World Investment 
and Trade 379. 
44 Achmea (n 24), Award on Jurisdiction, paras 175 ff.  
45 ibid, paras 187-193. 
46 ibid, paras 155-163. 
47 EURAM (n 22), Award on Jurisdiction para 117, emphasis added.  
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discrimination principle under EU law. The Commission furthermore 
relies on the supremacy of EU law, the sui generis character of EU Treaties, 
the rule of domestic courts as ordinary courts of the EU legal order, and 
Article 344 TFEU.48 Grounding its reasoning more substantively in 
international law, Slovakia supports the position of the Commission, based 
on Article 59 and Article 30(3) VCLT.49  The Czech Republic also 
intervened as amicus, supporting the Commission and Slovakia in its 
reasoning.50 Austria, on the other hand, took an opposing stand in its own 
amicus brief, submitting that the BIT remains in force and explicitly 
endorsing the tribunals reasoning in Achmea to this extent.51  
 
The above is indicative of a split between the Member States, which are 
commonly on the receiving end of disputes, i.e. Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, and those that historically have been home to investors, i.e. the 
Netherlands. While the former have an interest in ceding their role as a 
'punching ball' for foreign investors, the latter have a legitimate policy 
interest in protecting their investors, on whose well being the economy of 
the Member States, such as the Netherlands, largely depends. But even the 
reasoning of respondent States often appears to deviate from arguments 
brought by the Commission. The inconsistency between positions of 
individual Member States and that of the Commission unsurprisingly fails 
to convince investment tribunals of any existing EU position on this 
matter.  
 
IV. SYNTHESIS: THE 'INTRA-EU' VS. 'EXTRA-EU' 
MISCONCEPTION 
 
The diverging positions of the Commission vis-à-vis investor-state 
arbitration in respectively intra-EU and extra-EU BITs are seemingly easy 
to explain. Intra-EU BITs only involve actors on the internal market and 
are thus conceived as an internal matter. EU investment agreements, 
broadly subsumed under the concept of extra-EU BITs, involve 
relationships with third countries, which is a matter of EU external 
relations. This is also institutionally reinforced. Intra-EU BITs are the 
responsibility of the Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial 
Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA), whereas EU 
investment agreements (including the management of existing BITs 
between the Member States and third countries) fall within the ambit of 
the Directorate-General for Trade (DG TRADE). However, although a 
comparison of the two concepts of 'extra-EU' and 'intra-EU' are helpful 
for the purpose of contextualization, they risk being misconceived as 
diametrical opposites. 'Intra-EU' and 'extra-EU' are in fact adjectives that 
denominate a common legal complex, i.e. BITs and their ISDS provisions, 
and merely define the broader context of contractual relationships 
                                                
48 ibid, paras 118-120. 
49 ibid, paras 83-105. 
50 ibid, paras 121-125. 
51 ibid, para 61. 
17                                      European Journal of Legal Studies  [Vol.8 No.2 
 
 
underlying the investment arbitration. The Commission has acknowledged 
that external EU policies can have an internal effect, and vice versa.52 This 
is, however, not reflected in the Commission's approach towards ISDS in 
intra-EU and extra-EU BITs. Indeed, here the Commission largely ignores 
that ISDS raise similar concerns, for instance its effect on the internal 
market and its compatibility with the principle of autonomy.  
 
ISDS allows investors to pursue actions for damages before an 
international tribunal. Where this benefit is available to a selected group 
of investors on the internal market, while other investors in a comparable 
situation are left with judicial recourse before domestic courts only, the 
system is discriminatory. Unlike domestic courts, investment tribunals are 
neither entitled to refer questions on the interpretation of EU law to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), nor bound by the primacy 
of EU law and the case law of the CJEU.53 More generally, it facilitates 
certain investors to pick-and-choose the more favorable procedural 
framework.54 This situation may be problematic for the internal market, 
but it is by no means only symptomatic for investor-state arbitration under 
intra-EU BITs. On the contrary, a company that is incorporated in a 
Member State but which is owned or controlled by a national of a third 
country constitutes a company in accordance with Article 49 TFEU as well 
as, under certain circumstances, an investor under an extra-EU BIT.55 It is 
noteworthy, that the CJEU has already addressed this issue and 
determined that the nationality of a person or entity, which owns or 
controls a corporation, is not a criterion that justifies differential 
treatment.56 However, while the effect is similar to that under intra-EU 
BITs, it has not received any attention in the extra-EU context. 
Additionally, the Micula dispute has illustrated how investment awards 
might have an adverse effect on the internal market. In Micula, a dispute 
brought under the Sweden-Romania BIT, the award effectively reinstated 
illegal state aid, which Romania formerly withdrew in accordance with the 
Treaty. In these instances, the investment award constitutes a direct 
violation of EU law.57 EU rules on state aid apply to all entities on the 
internal market including those in foreign ownership. A scenario à la 
Micula is, thus, also conceivable in an extra-EU context.  
                                                
52 ibid, paras 127-129. 
53 Wehland (n 27), 300.  
54 Miron discusses the relationship of arbitration tribunals with the CJEU and points 
out that: '[the CJEU case law] may be identifying arbitration as a "safe shore" from 
the application of EU law, whenever the European norms may be disadvantageous for 
the party commencing arbitral proceedings', see Smaranda Miron, 'The Last Bite of 
the BITs – Supremacy of EU Law versus Investment Treaty Arbitration' (2014) 20(3) 
European Law Journal 332, 334. 
55 Markus Burgstaller, 'Nationality of Corporate Investors and International Claims 
against the Investor's Own State' (2006) 7(6) The Journal of World Investment & 
Trade 857. 
56 Factortame II (n 28), paras 29-33. 
57 Christian Tietje and Clemens Wackernagel, 'Enforcement of Intra-EU ICSID 
Awards' (2015) 16(2) The Journal of World Investment and Trade 205. 




As far as the principle of autonomy is concerned, the position of the 
Commission is remarkably ignorant. In accordance with Article 267 TFEU 
domestic courts of the Member States can, and in certain circumstances 
must, refer questions on the interpretation of EU law to the CJEU. In 
Opinion 1/09 the CJEU clarified that international agreements, which 
establish an international court or tribunal, may not '…deprive [domestic] 
courts of their task, as "ordinary" courts within the European Union legal 
order, to implement European Union law and, thereby, of the power 
provided for in Article 267 TFEU.'58 Relying on Opinion 1/09 the 
Commission argues in its official letter of notification that intra-EU 
investment tribunals are incompatible with the Treaty. Consequently, the 
Commission believes these investment tribunals to be concerned with the 
interpretation of EU law. This view is explicitly supported by the 
Commission's reasoning in its amicus briefs in, inter alia, EURAM.59 Yet 
again, this concern does not arise with regards to ISDS provisions in extra-
EU BITs. This is nonsensical considering that the intra-EU or extra-EU 
character of an investor-state tribunal is irrelevant for the question of 
whether or not the tribunal is seized with questions on the interpretation 
of EU law. 
 
Unlike the Member States,60 the Commission appears to see no link 
between the exercise of its external competence under Article 207 TFEU 
and its policy towards intra-EU BITs.61 This overreliance on 'intra-EU' and 
'extra-EU' as distinct legal concepts or categories of international 
agreements is entirely misleading. They are indeed only relevant from an 
EU law perspective, but have no bearing whatsoever on international 
investment tribunals. Hence, it would be erroneous to confine intra-EU 
BITs to the internal market and extra-EU BITs to EU foreign trade policy, 
without addressing substantive overlaps.  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This essay challenges the notion of coherence in EU foreign investment 
policy. The brief assessment of policy documents and legal positions 
demonstrates that the internal and external aspects of this policy area are 
incoherent and partly inconsistent (horizontal incoherence), which is 
                                                
58 Opinion 1/09 European Patents Court [2011] ECR I-1137 , para 80. 
59 EURAM (n 22), Award on Jurisdiction, para 120. 
60 Observations of the Netherlands, Achmea (n 24), Award on Jurisdiction, para 163:, 
'Currently, the European Union Member States are awaiting proposals from the 
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manifested through diverging positions within the Commission 
(institutional incoherence). Vertically, this incoherence manifests itself 
through the lack of a common position amongst the Member States. The 
reason for the schizophrenic position of the Commission can be found in 
the overreliance on 'intra-EU' and 'extra-EU' as concepts with conclusive 
policy ramifications. This is institutionally reflected in an internal 
bifurcation underlying the delegation of responsibilities to DG FISMA 
and DG TRADE. It is pivotal that both DGs see beyond this conceptual 
differentiation and conceive ISDS as a creature of international law, with 
common characteristics irrespective of its origin in intra-EU or extra-EU 
BITs. Coherence in this context requires DG FISMA and DG TRADE to 
work closer together and to coordinate their positions. This does not mean 
that policies directed at ISDS in an intra-EU and extra-EU context must 
be identical. Indeed, they cannot! The intricate web of intra-EU BITs 
simply cannot be renegotiated in accordance with the internal market, 
while compatibility of ISDS in extra-EU BITs is almost exclusively a 
drafting issue. As a positive process, coherence merely requires that 
overlapping concerns be addressed clearly and comprehensively in a 
manner that is consistent and coherent across the internal and external 
dimension of this area of EU policy. 
 
In the context of intra-EU BITs, coherence would furthermore be 
strengthened if the Member States were to align their positions. If the 
Member States that are commonly home countries to investors would 
suddenly act as amicus in support of a common EU position, it might finally 
also persuade investment tribunals. In the extra-EU context it would also 
be helpful if disagreements between Member States were addressed 
internally while displaying a common position externally. This could be 
achieved if the Commission becomes the prima facie respondent to 
investment disputes, not unlike the situation in the WTO. It is premature 
to predict how investment disputes will be handled, but the recently 
enacted regulation on financial responsibility under EU investment 
agreements provides a gateway in this respect.62  
 
Lastly, while the Lisbon Treaty attempted to reinforce the notion of 
coherence through institutional reform, reality suggests that existing or 
subsisting incoherence is more deeply embedded in diverging inter-
institutional and domestic policy interests. It is unhelpful that coherence is 
often referred to in terms of a notion, a concept, a guiding principle or 
even a mere idea, underlining its non-justiciability in EU law.63 Coherence 
is accordingly achieved through other principles of EU law and first and 
foremost through the principle of loyal cooperation.64 Loyal cooperation is 
                                                
62 Regulation 912/2014 (n 32); for a comprehensive analysis of the Regulation and the 
respondent mechanism see Hannes Lenk, 'Issues of attribution: responsibility of the 
EU in investment disputes under CETA' (2016) Transnational Dispute Management  
(forthcoming). 
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indeed instrumental in achieving coherence, but compliance with the 
principle can be satisfied without ultimately resulting in positive 
coherence. Therefore, to avoid coherence from becoming a grand idea – 
which, although perceived desirable from afar, can never actually be 
achieved – the time may be ripe to reconsider coherence in terms of a legal 
principle of EU law.  
